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ABSTRACT
On today’s Internet, combining the end-to-end security of TLS with
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) while ensuring the authenticity
of connections results in a challenging delegation problem. When
CDN servers provide content, they have to authenticate themselves
as the origin server to establish a valid end-to-end TLS connection
with the client. In standard TLS, the latter requires access to the
secret key of the server. To curb this problem, multiple workarounds
exist to realize a delegation of the authentication.
In this paper, we present a solution that renders key sharing
unnecessary and reduces the need for workarounds. By adapt-
ing identity-based signatures to this setting, our solution offers
short-lived delegations. Additionally, by enabling forward-security,
existing delegations remain valid even if the server’s secret key
leaks. We provide an implementation of the scheme and discuss
integration into a TLS stack. In our evaluation, we show that an ef-
ficient implementation incurs less overhead than a typical network
round trip. Thereby, we propose an alternative approach to current
delegation practices on the web.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Web protocol security; Key manage-
ment.
KEYWORDS
identity-based signatures; delegated credentials
1 INTRODUCTION
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [51] is the primary protocol for end-
to-end secure communication between two parties on untrusted
networks – and most importantly – on the Internet. It provides
confidentiality and authenticity of the transmitted payloads. Au-
thenticity of the endpoints and especially of the server is usually
established via certificates managed by a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) in the initial phase of the protocol, the handshake. In the pro-
cess, at least the server presents its certificate to the other party for
authentication.1 Certificates themselves are digitally signed docu-
ments that bind a public key and validity information to an identity,
e.g., to a hostname. In the PKI deployed on the web, certificates are
signed by trusted third-parties called Certificate Authorities (CAs)
vouching for their validity.
To meet the demand for performance, scalability and security,
Content DeliveryNetworks (CDNs) are nowwidely deployed. CDNs
provide content mirrored from the origin server via surrogate
servers closer to the client. In other words, they are systems of
∗This is the full version of a paper which appears in 2020 Cloud Computing Security
Workshop (CCSW ’20), November 9, 2020, Virtual Event, USA, ACM. https://doi.org/
10.1145/3411495.3421362
1Other methods such as pre-shared keys are not of importance for this work.
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Figure 1: Example network architecture of an origin server
using a Content Delivery Network (CDN). All communica-
tion over the Internet is secured usingTLS. The server grants
the right to act in its name to the CDN by sharing the secret
key skserver .
globally distributed servers that deliver content on behalf of web-
servers to users. For popular applications, a CDN reduces the load
on the origin servers, i.e., the webserver of the web application,
and allows applications to scale up to some extent as they grow
popular. A survey performed by Cisco Systems from 2017 until 2018
estimates that the data volume of the global CDN traffic will reach
252 exabytes per month in 2022 [25].
Since security requirements do not change when using a CDN,
CDNs need to serve an origin server’s content over TLS. Further,
as the web client needs to verify the identity of the server using a
certificate, the secret key counterpart of the public key is needed
to sign the TLS handshake for authentication. Thus, for a CDN to
share content on behalf of an origin server, the CDN needs access to
the secret key of the certificate bound to the origin server’s domain.
Since TLS – by design – currently lacks any form of delegation,
the easiest solution is to simply hand over the secret key to the
CDN. However, sharing the secret key constitutes a security loop-
hole as the owner of the domain loses control over the associated
certificate to a CDN. It makes more entities privy to the secret key
of a certificate and consequently increases the possibility of key
leakage. Furthermore, an origin server cannot constrain a CDN to
only respond to specific requests nor constrain a CDN from acting
without permission on its behalf. The delegation can also not be re-
voked without revoking the origin server’s certificate and rotating
keys. Suffice to say, such practices increases security risks in the
TLS ecosystem, as discussed in recent works [20, 45].
The practice of secret key sharing as illustrated in Figure 1 is also
known as Custom Certificate [45]. Together with Cruiseliner Cer-
tificates (or Shared Certificates) [20, 45] these practices are known
as “full delegation” [11, 46] in the literature. Cruiseliner Certificates
allow CDNs to manage the users’ certificates on their behalf. That
is usually done with certificates valid for multiple domains using
the Subject Alternative Name X.509 extension [54]. With these
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types of certificates, the domain owners also loose control over
their certificates. Additionally, listing a set of domains in the same
certificate has implication on privacy, e.g., when it reveals internal
hostnames. Furthermore, it can enable customers, served using the
same certificate, to impersonate each other.
To give an estimation on how widespread such practices are
in practice, Cangialosi et al. [20] analyzed their use in 2016 and
reported that 76.5% of all organizations on the web share at least
one private key with third-party organizations such as CDNs. Some
of these third-party organizations are responsible for certificate
management, i.e., revocation and reissuing. Furthermore, ten of
such third-party organizations have the private keys of as much as
45.3% of all the sites on the web.
Delegation in TLS. Alternative approaches to avoid the security
issues of full delegation have been proposed over the years (cf.
[22] for a recent survey of delegation techniques). We will discuss
some approaches in the following. Liang et al. [45] carried out a
systematic study on the interplay between HTTPS and CDNs in
2014. On examination of 20 popular CDN providers and 10,721 of
their customers, they revealed various problems regarding practices
adopted by CDN providers, such as private key sharing, neglected
revocation, and insecure back-end communication. As a remedy,
they proposed a lightweight extension for DANE [35] to tackle the
delegation problem caused by the end-to-end nature of HTTPS
and the man-in-the-middle nature of CDNs. In short, the origin
server adds both its certificate and the CDNs certificate as its TLSA
records to DNS. On receiving the CDN’s certificate, the client rec-
ognizes the delegation if the CDN’s certificate appears in the origin
server’s TLSA record. However, the proposed solution by Liang
et al. requires changes to certificate validation on the client. Be-
sides, the extra roundtrip to retrieve the TLSA records during a TLS
handshake increases connection latency.
Cloudflare deployed Keyless SSL [59] to omit sharing of the
private keys. In short, Keyless SSL splits up the TLS handshake.
It allows to establish a TLS session to the CDN, while the private
key operations are outsourced to a key server (controlled by the
domain owner). Therefore, the domain owner can maintain control
of its private key and avoids full delegation of the key to the CDN
operator. Stebila et al. [58] examined the security and performance
of the approach. They found that performance slightly worsens.
Bhargavan et al. [10] demonstrated several new attacks on Keyless
SSL. They also presented a security definition for authenticated and
confidential channel establishment involving 3 parties to model
the additional key server, dubbed 3(S)ACCE-security, based on 2-
party ACCE security definitions that have been used in several
proofs for TLS [39, 42]. Furthermore, they proposed modifications
to Keyless SSL for TLS 1.2 achieving 3(S)ACCE-security guarantees.
Also, they strongly argued for a new design for Keyless TLS 1.3
which is computational lighter and requires simpler assumptions
than the proposed modifications of TLS 1.2.
Recently, Delegated Credentials (DeC) [5] have been proposed
to replace Keyless SSL. A DeC is a digitally signed data structure
that contains a validity period, and a public key along with the
signature algorithm. By signing the data structure, the origin server
delegates to the included public key. Integration into the TLS pro-
tocol happens via a specific TLS extension. DeC appear to be an
attractive proposition and are currently evaluated by Mozilla [38],
Cloudflare [60], and Facebook [33].
Chuat et al. [23] investigated the potential of proxy certificates
solving the long-standing problems of revocation and delegation
in the web PKI. In this case, holders of a non-CA certificate can
issue proxy certificates. Thereby, holders of a non-CA certificate
are able to delegated signing privileges to other entities in a fine-
grained manner. In case of a key compromise, Chuat et al. claim
that limiting the proxy certificate’s lifetime to an arbitrary short
timespan may curb problems of revocation.
Name Constraints is an extension to X.509 certificates [26] which
defines the namespace for which all subsequent certificates below
the certificate that defines the Name Constraints extension must
reside. Since Name Constraints can only be used in a CA certificate,
a root CA can issue an intermediate CA certificate to the origin
server that allows the origin server to issue child certificates limited
to hostnames in its restricted namespace. However, Liang et al. [45]
showed that name constraints have poor support in browsers, and
when not properly checked, allow the origin server to create and
use certificates that are not restricted to its namespace.
In a different work [22], Chuat et al. proposed a 19-criteria frame-
work for characterizing those revocation and delegation schemes.
Further, they propose that combining short-lived DeC or proxy
certificates with functional revocation may curb several of these
problems in web PKI.
Finally, we want to mention approaches such as STYX [67] which
require the presence of trusted execution environments such as
Intel SGX. Due to wide range of attacks against such systems, e.g.,
[17, 18, 55], we do not consider them as a viable approach.
Delegation and Multi-Entity Communication in Other Protocols.
Various types of delegations are also interesting for other protocols
besides TLS or variants of TLS for special use-cases. Kogan et al.
developed Guardian Angel, a delegation agent, to solve the problem
of delegation in SSH [41]. The system allows a user to choose which
delegate systems can run commands on which servers.
Naylor et al. [49] developed mcTLS, which extends TLS to sup-
port middleboxes. mcTLS allows TLS endpoints (i.e., clients and
webservers) to introduce middleboxes in secure end-to-end con-
nection while restricting what the middleboxes can read or write.
However, Bhargavan et al. [9] show that mcTLS is insecure and
susceptible to a class of attack called middlebox confusion attacks.
They suggested a provable secure alternative to mcTLS avoiding
the middlebox confusion issue. Cho et al. [21] proposed D2TLS, a
mutual authentication agent that helps cloud-based IoT devices
set up secure connections by leveraging the session resumption
in DTLS [52] while keeping the device’s secret key secure. D2TLS
requires a change to the IoT device, and it is only capable of mutual
authentication.
Wagner et al. [65] discuss the application of delegation schemes
in trust management. They propose a scheme similar to DeC, which
uses a XML structure to define generic constraints of the delegation.
Delegation in Cryptography. While standard signature and public-
key encryption schemes are not designed to allow delegation of any
kind, the introduction of identity-based cryptography [31, 34, 56]
started an exciting avenue that enables delegation of signing and en-
cryption rights. While literature usually formulates identity-based
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systems without public keys, the public parameters are often inter-
preted as a public key. From this viewpoint, (hierarchical) identity-
based systems enable delegation based on the identities and can be
managed per public key. For encryption, such fine-grained control
is, for example, achieved by attributed-based encryption [32], func-
tional encryption [15], and fully puncturable encryption [29] built
on ideas found in hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes
such as the one of Boneh, Boyen and Goh [12].
Interestingly, there is a close connection between identity-based
encryption and signatures. Naor described and Boneh and Franklin
later sketched [13] a transformation that turns secure identity-
based encryption scheme into an unforgeable signature scheme.
This observation can be generalized to (hierarchical) identity-based
signature schemes: any hierarchical identity-based encryption [31]
scheme with ℓ + 1 levels implies a hierarchical identity-based sig-
nature scheme with ℓ levels (cf. [40]). Alternatively, identity-based
signatures can also be obtained generically from two standard signa-
ture schemes [8, 56]. This paradigm can also be extended to obtain
forward-secure identity-based signatures and identity-based proxy
signatures [30].
The latter, proxy signatures, were introduced by Mambo et
al. [46]. Their goal is also to allow the delegation of signing rights.
There, the verifier checks that the signature was signed by the
proxy and that signing rights were delegated to the proxy. Similar
to identity-based signatures, they can be built from standard sig-
nature schemes [11]. While proxy signatures have a long history,
including paring- and lattice-based constructions [16, 44], they have
not seen much adaption in the context of TLS. As noted before,
Chuat et al. [22] propose them as one approach to fix the delegation
issue in TLS.
1.1 Our Contribution
The goal of our research is to address delegation between the origin
server and the CDN. A good solution to the problem should fulfill
the following requirements: (1) Private keys must be kept private
to the origin server, and the origin server must retain control over
the private key. Thereby, compromise of keys outside of the origin
server’s control is mitigated. (2) The origin server should be able
to delegate signing privileges in a fine-grained manner. That is,
regardless of the possible choices of CDNs, the origin server is able
to delegate keys on a per CDN basis, where one delegation does not
prohibit further delegations. (3) The origin server should be able
to decide the validity period of the delegation. Even if the origin
server prefers short validity periods, the overhead of the delegation
should stay minimal. (4) Furthermore, the origin server’s private
key should be equipped with forward-security features to reduce
the overall risk. Thereby, even if the server’s private key leaks,
delegations that occurred before the leak remain valid. (5) Finally,
support for such a system should not require specific hardware such
as trusted execution environments and Intel SGX to be present.
In this work, we provide a solution following the proposal of
Chuat et al. [22] on a cryptographic level. In contrast to the emerg-
ing paradigm of Delegated Credentials (DeC), our approach does
not delegate to a different key pair, but instead derives constrained
secret keys for the existing key pair. To do so, we investigate vari-
ants of identity-based signatures which we equip with additional
features. Specifically, we extend them with an epoch that fixes
identity-based delegations to a specific time-span, forming a scheme
called time-bound identity-based signatures (TBIBΣ). Thereby, the
origin server delegates signing rights with respect to the origin
server’s public key to the CDN. However, the key is only valid for a
certain time period. If the origin server later decides that the CDN
should no longer be able to establish TLS connections using the
origin server’s certificate, it suffices to no longer provide delegated
keys of forthcoming epochs to the CDN. It is not necessary for the
origin server to entirely revoke keys and obtain fresh certificates.
Short-lived delegations therefore represent an alternative approach
to revocation [50, 62].
Furthermore, we provide a forward-secure version of time-bound
identity-based signatures. Contrary to forward-secure identity-
based signatures, delegated keys stay bound to a specific time period.
In our case, forward-security is provided for the master secret key
kept by the origin server by applying a technique introduced by
Canetti, Halevi and Katz [19].
To underline the practicability of our approach, we provide im-
plementations and benchmarks of the proposed schemes. Specifi-
cally, we show that while usage of the scheme would incur a small
overhead, the runtime overhead of an optimized implementation
is below typical network round trip times. Therefore, the perfor-
mance impact on TLS is small. This observation is confirmed by an
integration of the scheme into a TLS stack. We thereby also show,
that the changes to get the approach implemented in a TLS stack
were limited to typical steps when adding a new signature scheme.
Finally, we note that our scheme is not limited to managing
delegations with CDNs. Without any changes, it can be applied
to scenarios where website providers serve content from multiple
servers themselves. Instead of distributing the private key to every
server, delegating keys to the web servers from a central key server
helps to significantly reduce the risk of leaking the secret key.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly recall some notions of identity-based
signature schemes.
2.1 Hierarchical Identity-Based Signatures
(Hierarchical) Identity-based signature schemes [31] extend the
standard notion of signature schemes(cf. Appendix A) with an
additional key delegation algorithm Del to support the delegation
of signing rights based on identities. Verify takes the identities as
an additional argument, and verification only succeeds if the key
used during signing was delegated for those particular identities.
We briefly recall the formal definition and adapt them for the multi-
instance setting.
Definition 2.1. A hierarchical identity-based signature scheme
(HIBS) consists of PPT algorithms (Setup,Gen,Del, Sign,Verify)
such that:
Setup(1κ , ℓ) : On input of security parameter κ and hierarchy pa-
rameter ℓ, outputs public parameters pp.
Gen(pp) : On input of public parameters pp, outputs a master
signing key skε and a verification key pk with message spaceM.
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The experiment has access to the following oracles:
Del′(skε , id) : Stores id in QID and returns Del(skε , id).
Sign′(sk, id,m) : This oracle computes skid ← Del(skε , id),
σ ← Sign(skid ,m), addsm to Q, and returns σ .
Experiment Expeuf-cmaHIBS,A (κ, ℓ)
pp← Setup(1κ , ℓ), (pk, sk) ← Gen(pp)
(m∗, id∗,σ ∗) ← ADel′(skε , ·),Sign′(skε , ·, ·)(pk)
if Verify(pk, id∗,m∗,σ ∗) = 0, return 0
ifm∗ ∈ Q, return 0
if ∃id ∈ QID such that id is a prefix of id∗, return 0
return 1
Experiment 1: The EUF-CMA experiment for a hierarchical
identity-base signature scheme HIBS.
Del(skid′ , id) : On input of secret key skid′ and id ∈ ID≤ℓ , out-
puts a secret key skid for id iff id ′ is a prefix of id, otherwise
skid′ .
Sign(skid ,m) : On input of a secret key skid and a messagem ∈ M,
outputs a signature σ .
Verify(pk, id,m,σ ) : On input of a public key pk, an identity id ∈
ID≤ℓ , a messagem ∈ M and a signature σ , outputs a bit b.
Below, we present the standard existential unforgeability under
adaptively chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA security) notion. It
extends the standard notion of EUF-CMA security for signature
schemes by allowing the adversary to query keys for identities as
long as they are not prefixes of the target identity.
Definition 2.2 (EUF-CMA). For any PPT adversary A, we define
the advantage in the EUF-CMA experiment Expeuf-cmaHIBS,A (cf. Experi-
ment 1) as
Adveuf-cmaHIBS,A (κ) := Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaHIBS,A (κ) = 1
]
.
A signature scheme Σ is EUF-CMA-secure, if Adveuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) is a
negligible function in κ for all PPT adversaries A.
2.2 Naor Transform: Signatures from
Identity-Based Encryption
Based on transformfirst proposed byNaor [13], hierarchical identity-
based signature can be obtained from hierarchical identity-based en-
cryption (HIBE) [31], a generalization of identity-based encryption
(IBE) [13]. These encryption schemes enable delegation of decryp-
tion rights based on identities in a hierarchical fashion. Identities at
some level can delegate secret keys to its descendant entities, but
cannot decrypt ciphertexts intended for other (hierarchical) identi-
ties. Before we discuss the Naor transform, we recall a definition of
HIBEs supporting multiple instances (cf. [29]) below.
Definition 2.3 (HIBE). An hierarchical identity-based encryption
(HIBE) schemewithmessage spaceM and identity spaceID≤ℓ , for
some ℓ ∈ N, consists of the PPT algorithms (Setup,Gen,Del, Enc,Dec):
Setup(1κ , ℓ) : On input of security parameter κ and hierarchy pa-
rameter ℓ, outputs public parameters pp.
Gen(pp) : On input of public parameters pp, outputs a keypair
(pk, skε ).
The experiment has access to the following oracles:
Del1(skε , id) : Stores id in Q and returns Del(skε , id).
Del2(skε , id) : This oracle checks whether id is a prefix of id∗ and
returns ⊥ if so. Otherwise it returns Del(skε , id).
Experiment Exphibe-ind-cpaHIBE,A (κ, ℓ)
pp← Setup(1κ , ℓ), (pk, skε ) ← Gen(pp), b←$ {0, 1}
(id∗,m0,m1, st) ← ADel1(skε , ·)(pk)
if ∃id ∈ Q such that id is a prefix of id∗, return 0
ifm0,m1 <M or |M0 | , |M1 |, return 0
b∗ ← ADel2(skε , ·)(st, Enc(pk, id∗,mb ))
if b = b∗ return then 1, else return 0
Experiment 2: The HIBE-IND-CPA experiment for a HIBE
scheme.
Del(skid′ , id) : On input secret key skid′ and id ∈ ID≤ℓ , outputs
a secret key skid for id iff id ′ is a prefix of id, otherwise skid′ .
Enc(pk, id,m) : On input of a public key pk, a message m ∈ M
and an identity id ∈ ID≤ℓ , outputs a ciphertext cid for id.
Dec(skid′ , cid ) : On input of a secret key skid′ and a ciphertext cid ,
outputsm ∈ M ∪ {⊥}.
For correctness, we require that all secret keys that are delegated
for the identity (or a prefix) associated to a ciphertext, are able to
decrypt it. More formally, we require for all κ, ℓ ∈ N, all pp ←
Setup(1κ , ℓ), all (pk, skε ) ← Gen(pp), all m ∈ M, all id, id ′ ∈
ID≤ℓ where id ′ is a prefix of id, all skid ← Del(skid′ , id), all
cid ← Enc(pk, id,m), Dec(skid , cid ) =m holds.
Next we recall the standard security notion of indistinguishabil-
ity under chosen ciphertext attacks. Here an adversary chooses a
target identity and two messages and may query keys for identi-
ties as long as the queries identities are not a prefix of the target
identity. Then, given the encryption of one of the two messages
under the target identity, the adversary needs to determine which
message was encrypted. The adversary should not be able to win
this experiment better than guessing.
Definition 2.4. For any PPT adversaryA, we define the advantage
in theHIBE-IND-CPA experiment Exphibe-ind-cpaHIBE,A (cf. Experiment 2)
as
Advhibe-ind-cpaHIBE,A (κ, ℓ) :=
Pr [Exphibe-ind-cpaHIBE,A (κ, ℓ) = 1] − 12  ,
for an integer ℓ ∈ N. AHIBE isHIBE-IND-CPA-secure, ifAdvhibe-ind-cpaHIBE,A
(κ, ℓ) is a negligible function in κ for all PPT adversaries A.
Subsequently, we provide a concrete HIBE construction on bi-
linear groups and, in particular, present a variant of the Boneh-
Boyen-Goh (BBG) HIBE [12] with an explicit Setup algorithm to
generate shared parameters in Scheme 1. We choose to instantiate
our approach using asymmetric bilinear groups in the type 3 setting
as they represent the state-of-the-art regarding efficiency and simi-
larity of the security levels of the base and target groups. Let BGen
be an algorithm that, on input a security parameter 1κ , outputs
BG = (p, e,G1,G2,GT ,д, дˆ) ← BGen(1κ ), where G1, G2, GT are
groups of prime order p with bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT and
generators д, дˆ of G1 and G2, respectively.
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Setup(1κ , ℓ) : Generate a bilinear group (p, e,G1,G2,GT ,д, дˆ) ←
BGen(1κ ) and д2,д3,h1, . . . ,hℓ ←$ G1, fix a hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and return pp ←
(H ,p, e,G1,G2,GT ,д, дˆ,д2,д3,h1, . . . ,hℓ).
Gen(pp) : Choose α ←$ Zp and return (pk, sk) ← (дˆα ,дα2 ).
Del(skid , id) : Parse id as (I1, . . . , Ik ) with k ≤ ℓ,
- If skid is the master secret дα2 , sample v ←$ Zp and return (дα2 ·
(hH (I1)1 · · ·h
H (Ik )
k · д3)v , дˆv ,hvk+1, . . . ,hvℓ ),
- else assume that skid is (дα2 · (h
H (I1)
1 · · ·h
H (Ik−1)
k−1 ·
д3)v ′ , дˆv ′ ,hv ′k , . . . ,hv
′
ℓ
) = (a0,a1,bk , . . . ,bℓ), sample w ←$ Zp
and output (a0 · bH (Ik )k · (h
H (I1)
1 · · ·h
H (Ik )
k · д3)w ,a1 · дˆw ,bk+1 ·
hwk+1, . . . ,bℓ · hwℓ ).
Enc(pk, id,m) : Parse id as (I1, . . . , Ik ) ∈ (Z∗p )k with k ≤ ℓ, sample
s ←$ Zp , and return (C1,C2,C3) ← (e(д2, pk)s ·m, дˆs , (hH (I1)1 · . . . ·
h
H (Ik )
k · д3)s ).
Dec(skid , cid ) : Consider id = (I1, . . . , Ik ) with k ≤ ℓ, parse
skid as (a0,a1,bk+1, . . . ,bℓ), cid as (C1,C2,C3). Return m ←
C1 · e(C3,a1) · e(a0,C2)−1.
Scheme 1: HIBE-IND-CPA-secure version of the BBG HIBE.
We are now ready to recall the IBE-to-signature transformation
from Naor [13]: a signature on a message m under skid is just a
HIBE secret key delegated for id ′ = (id∥m) which is verified by
encrypting a random message for id ′ and then trying to decrypt it
using the key in the signature. More generally, it converts any level
ℓ + 1 HIBE to a level ℓ HIBS (cf. [40]) as depicted in Scheme 2. In
the special case with ℓ = 0, we obtain a signature scheme from an
IBE. Prominent signatures schemes that are based on this technique
includes BLS [14].
Setup(1κ , ℓ) : Let pp← HIBE.Setup(1κ , ℓ + 1) and return pp.
Gen(pp) : Run (pk, sk) ← HIBE.Gen(pp) and return (pk, sk).
Del(skid′ , id) : Return skid ← HIBE.Del(skid′ , id).
Sign(skid ,m) : Parse id as id1, . . . , idl and return σ ←
HIBE.Del(sk, (id1, . . . , idℓ ,m)).
Verify(pk, (idi )ℓi=1,m,σ ) : Choose m′←$ HIBE.M and com-
pute c ← HIBE.Enc(pk, (id1, . . . , idℓ ,m),m′). Return 1 if
HIBE.Dec(σ , c) =m′, otherwise return 0.
Scheme 2: (Hierarchical identity-based) Signature scheme
obtained by applying Naor-transform to HIBE.
Theorem 2.5 ([27]). If HIBE is HIBE-IND-CPA secure and has a
message space that is exponentially large in the security parameter,
then Scheme 2 is EUF-CMA secure.
3 TBIBΣ: TIME-BOUND IDENTITY-BASED
SIGNATURES
In this section, we introduce a special-case of hierarchical identity-
based signatures: time-bound identity-based signatures. The scheme
keeps the identity-based delegationmechanism provided by identity-
based signatures, but at the same time it is modified to support an
epoch besides an identity. The epoch is designed to be used in a
way that the identity-based delegations are bound to a time period.
Thereby, even if one has received a delegated key, this key is not
useful before or after the corresponding period. Additionally, we
introduce the notion of forward-security for the master secret key
that is used for all delegations at almost no additional cost.
3.1 Syntax and Definitions
First we start with the syntax of time-bound identity-based signa-
tures. Therefore, we extend the definition of identity-based signa-
tures by adding an epoch to the sign and verification algorithms as
well as the delegation algorithm.
Definition 3.1 (Time-bound Identity-Based Signatures). A time-
bound identity-based signatures scheme TBIBΣ with identity-space
ID consists of the PPT algorithms (Gen, Sign,Verify,Del), which
are defined as follows:
Gen(1κ ,n) : On input of a security parameter κ and maximal num-
ber of epochs n, outputs a signing key sk and a verification key
pk with associated message spaceM.2
Sign(ski, id ,m) : On input of a secret key ski, id for an identity id ∈
ID and an epoch i ∈ [n] and a message m ∈ M, outputs a
signature σ .
Verify(pk, i, id,m,σ ) : On input of a public key pk, an identity id ∈
ID, an epoch i ∈ [n], a message m ∈ M and a signature σ ,
outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Del(sk, i, id) : On input of a secret key sk, an identity id ∈ ID
and an epoch i ∈ [n], outputs a secret key ski, id .
Such a scheme is considered correct if for all security parameters
κ ∈ N and n = n(κ) ∈ N, for all (sk, pk) ← Gen(1κ ,n), for all
id ∈ ID, for all i ∈ [n], for all extracted keys ski, id ← Del(sk, i, id),
for allm ∈ M, we have that
Pr
[
Verify(pk, i, id,m, Sign(ski, id ,m)) = 1
]
= 1.
For unforgeability, the standard security notion of EUF-CMA se-
curity is extended to cover the epoch for the delegation of keys. The
goal of the adapted notion is to have the adversary select a target
epoch and identity. The scheme is then considered unforgeable as
long as the adversary is unable to forge a signature for the selected
target epoch and identity – even if the adversary has access to keys
for the target identity for other epochs or keys for other identities.
Definition 3.2 (EUF-CMA). For any PPT adversary A, we define
the advantage in the EUF-CMA experiment Expeuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A (cf. Experi-
ment 3) as
Adveuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A(κ,n) := Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A(κ,n) = 1
]
,
for an integern ∈ N. A time-bound identity-based signature scheme
TBIBΣ is EUF-CMA-secure, if Adveuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A(κ,n) is a negligible func-
tion in κ for all PPT adversaries A.
Remark 1. Wenote thatwhile the syntax is very similar to forward-
secure identity-based signatures [30], the goals are different. In such
a signature scheme, the forward-security of keys is considered per
2We allow n = ∞ to denote an unbounded number of epochs.
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The experiment has access to the following oracles:
Sign′(sk, i, id,m) : This oracle computes ski, id ← Del(sk, i, id),
σ ← Sign(skid,i ,m), addsm to Q, and returns σ .
Del′(sk, i, id) : Stores (i, id) in QID and returns Del(sk, i, id).
Experiment Expeuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A(κ,n)
pp← Setup(1κ ,n), (pk, sk) ← Gen(pp)
(m∗, i∗, id∗,σ ∗) ← ADel′(sk, ·),Sign′(sk, ·, ·, ·)(pk)
if Verify(pk, i∗, id∗,m∗,σ ∗) = 0, return 0
ifm∗ ∈ Q, return 0
if (i∗, id∗) ∈ QID , return 0
return 1
Experiment 3: The EUF-CMA experiment for a time-bound
identity-based signature scheme TBIBΣ.
identity, i.e., each user gets a master secret key for their identity.
Hence, users are able to update their own keys to the next epoch.
For TBIBΣ, the goal is to prevent any updates, and thus updates of
delegatable keys are not possible.
Henceforth, we also introduce a forward-secure version of time-
bound identity-based signatures:
Definition 3.3. A forward-secure time-bound identity-based sig-
natures scheme fs-TBIBΣ extends Definition 3.1 with a PPT algo-
rithm Update such that:
Update(ski−1) : On input of a secret key ski for epoch i−1, outputs
a secret key ski for epoch i .
Del(ski , id) : On input of a secret key ski for epoch i and an identity
id ∈ ID, outputs a secret key ski, id .
Correctness is defined as before, but the derived keys are ob-
tained via ski ← Update(ski−1) and then ski, id ← Del(ski , id).
Subsequently, we present unforgeability for fs-TBIBΣ. In this case,
the adversary may also query the secret key for an epoch by query-
ing the Update′ oracle. The adversary then has to forge a signature
for an epoch before any epoch queried via Update′ and is also not
allowed to query delegated keys for the target epoch and identity.
The experiment has access to the following oracles:
Sign′(sk0, i, id,m) : This oracle computes ski, id ← Del(sk0, i, id),
σ ← Sign(skid,i ,m), addsm to Q, and returns σ .
Del′(sk0, i, id) : Stores (i, id) in QID and returns Del(sk0, i, id).
Update′(sk0, i) : Stores i in Qt , runs skj ← Update(skj−1) for
j ∈ [i], and returns ski
Experiment Expfs−euf-cmafs-TBIBΣ,A(κ,n)
pp← Setup(1κ ,n), (pk, sk) ← Gen(pp)
(m∗, i∗, id∗,σ ∗) ← ADel′(sk, ·),Sign′(sk, ·, ·, ·),Update′(sk0, ·)(pk)
if Verify(pk, i∗ − 1, id∗,m∗,σ ∗) = 0, return 0
ifm∗ ∈ Q, return 0
if (i∗ − 1, id∗) ∈ QID , return 0
if {1, . . . , i∗ − 1} ∩ Qt , ∅, return 0
return 1
Experiment 4: The EUF-CMA experiment for a forward-
secure time-bound identity-based signature scheme TBIBΣ.
Definition 3.4 (fsEUF-CMA). For any PPT adversary A, we de-
fine the advantage in the fsEUF-CMA experiment Expfs−euf-cmaTBIBΣ,A (cf.
Experiment 4) as
Adveuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A(κ,n) := Pr
[
Expeuf-cmafs-TBIBΣ,A,n (κ) = 1
]
,
for an integern ∈ N. A time-bound identity-based signature scheme
fs-TBIBΣ is fsEUF-CMA-secure, if Advfs−euf-cmafs-TBIBΣ,A(κ,n) is a negligi-
ble function in κ for all PPT adversaries A.
Before discussing constructions of the scheme, we want to note
that using generic transformation from [30], TBIBΣ and fs-TBIBΣ
can be turned into (forward-secure) identity-based proxy signatures.
Indeed, if the identity for delegation is the delegatee’s public key,
and each signature is extended with a signature by that key, we
obtain a proxy signature scheme.
3.2 Generic TBIBΣ Construction
First, we start with a generic construction of TBIBΣ from identity-
based signatures. Observe that to achieve an EUF-CMA-secure
TBIBΣ scheme, delegation of the keys is relative to both epochs
and identities. So, the idea is to map TBIBΣ’s epoch and identity
to an identity of the underlying identity-based signature scheme.
Without the goal to achieve forward-secrecy, this mapping is simply
a concatenation of epoch and identity. As the epoch is only used to
partition time, it can be viewed as giving a specific meaning to a
part of the identity of an IBS. We present the scheme in Scheme 3.
Setup(1κ ,n) : : Let pp ← IBS.Setup(1κ ) with IBS.ID =
{0, 1} ⌈log2(n)⌉ × ID and return pp.
Gen(pp) : Return (pk, sk) ← IBS.Gen(pp).
Del(sk, i, id) : Return ski, id ← IBS.Del(sk, i∥id).
Sign(ski, id ,m) : Return σ ← IBS.Sign(ski, id ,m).
Verify(pk, i, id,m,σ ) : Return IBS.Verify(pk, i∥id,m,σ ).
Scheme 3: Generic TBIBΣ scheme from any IBS.
EUF-CMA security follows directly the underlying IBS scheme:
Theorem3.5. If IBS is EUF-CMA-secure, then Scheme 3 is EUF-CMA-
secure, i.e. if there is an EUF-CMA-adversaryA against TBIBΣ, then
there exists an EUF-CMA-adversary against IBS with
Adveuf-cmaTBIBΣ,A(1κ ,n) = Adveuf-cmaIBS,B (1κ ).
Proof. Let A be an EUF-CMA-adversary against TBIBΣ. We
build an EUF-CMA-adversaryB against IBSwith IBS.ID = {0, 1}k×
ID. Indeed, if B is started on a public key pkIBS, we run A with
pkTBIBΣ ← pkIBS and the oracles are simulated honestly using
the corresponding IBS oracles. Once A outputs a forgery σ ∗ for i∗,
id∗,m∗ and forwards it as a IBS forgery for i∗∥id∗ andm∗. A valid
forgery for TBIBΣ is also a valid forgery for IBS, since if (i∗, id∗)
was not queried on the TBIBΣ.Del′ oracle, then neither was i∗∥id∗
queried on IBS.Del′. Similarly, the same is true form∗. □
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Setup(1κ ,n) : Let pp ← HIBS.Setup(1κ , 1 + ⌈log2(n)⌉) with
HIBS.ID such that {0, 1} ⊂ HIBS.ID and ID ⊂ HIBS.ID.
Return pp
Gen(pp) : Set (pk, sk0) ← HIBS.Gen(pp), push sk0 onto the empty
stack s , and return (pk, (sk0, s)).
Update(ski ) : Parse ski as (ski , s) and return DFEval(sk(i), s).
Del(ski , id) : Parse ski as (sk(i), ·) and return ski, id ←
HIBS.Del(sk(i), (bin2id(i), id))
Sign(ski, id ,m) : Return HIBS.Sign(ski, id , (bin2id(i), id),m).
Verify(pk, i, id,m,σ ) : Return HIBS.Verify(pk, (bin2id(i), id),m).
Scheme 4: Generic fs-TBIBΣ scheme from a HIBS.
3.3 Forward-Secure Construction from HIBS
We now consider a direct construction of fs-TBIBΣ from HIBS. In
contrast to Section 3.2, the main difference is the management of
the master secret key. The key has to be updated from one epoch to
another while still allowing identity-based derivations. Therefore,
we follow a standard approach due to Canetti, Halevi and Katz [19]
to achieve forward-secrecy. The idea is to manage the epochs in
a tree such that the individual epochs are the leaves of the tree,
whereas epoch 0 is placed at the root. Consequently, when mapping
the epochs to keys, we place the master secret key, sk0, at the root.
Once the key is updated to the first epoch, it should no longer be
possible to access sk0, yet deriving keys for all other epochs. Hence,
we remove the root key and keep the keys delegated for the two
child nodes. For the left child node this process is repeated until
the left most leaf node is reached. Later, when updating to the next
epoch, one removes the key for the current epoch and, starting
from the associated leaf node searches for the first non-removed
sibling along to the path to the root node. If this node is not a leaf
node, then as in the first step, the associated key is removed and
those for the child nodes are kept. For the left child the process is
again iterated until a leaf node is reached.
More formally, the key update algorithm traverses the tree in
a depth-first manner. Hence the keys are viewed as stack, and
when visiting a node, the derived secret keys are pushed onto
the stack. We define an algorithm DFEval that performs the stack
manipulation (adapted from [28]). Notation-wise, we denote the
root node withwε and all other nodes are encoded as binary strings,
i.e., for a node w(i), we denote child nodes asw(i0) andw(i1). For
encoding the epoch as identities, we define bin2id(i) which maps
each bit of i (considered as ⌈log2 n⌉-bit number) to 0 and 1 identities,
i.e. bin2id(b(1) . . .b(n)2 ) = (b(1), . . . ,b(n)).
DFEval(s) : On input of the stack s , perform the following steps:
• Pop the topmost element, (sk(i)), from the stack s .
• Repeat whilewi is an internal node:
– Set sk(i0) ← HIBS.Del(sk(i), bin2id(i0))
– Set sk(i1) ← HIBS.Del(sk(i), bin2id(i1))
– Push sk(i1) onto s and set i ← i0
• Return sk(i) and the new stack s
We give the full scheme in Scheme 4.
Next we show that Scheme 4 is in fact fsEUF-CMA-secure.
Theorem 3.6. If HIBS is EUF-CMA-secure, then Scheme 4 is
fsEUF-CMA-secure. For an EUF-CMA-adversaryA against Scheme 4,
there exists an EUF-CMA-adversary against B such that
Advfs−euf-cmafs-TBIBΣ,A(1κ ,n) = Adveuf-cmaHIBS,B (1κ , ⌈log2(n)⌉ + 1).
Proof. The proof follows the same idea as the proof of The-
orem 3.5. We note, that the Update′ oracle cannot be simulated
honestly. However, it is possible to simulate it in the following way:
given an epoch i , directly obtain ski asHIBS.Del′(sk, bin2id(i)) and
build the stack by querying HIBS.Del′ by querying the keys for all
right sibling nodes along the path from the i-th leave to the root.
Note that for a valid forgery, we have that for no i < i∗ the
Update′ oracle was queried. Consequently, the Del′ oracle of the
HIBS is never queried on a prefix of bin2id(i∗), and thus the forgery
is also valid for HIBS. □
As for TBIBΣ, EUF-CMA-security of the underlying HIBS im-
plies the EUF-CMA-security of Scheme 4:
Theorem3.7. IfHIBS is EUF-CMA-secure, then Scheme 4 is EUF-CMA-
secure. For an EUF-CMA-adversaryA against Scheme 4, there exists
an EUF-CMA-adversary against B such that
Adveuf-cmafs-TBIBΣ,A(1κ ,n) = Adveuf-cmaHIBS,B (1κ , ⌈log2(n)⌉ + 1).
The proof is the same as for Theorem 3.5 with the simulation of
the Update-oracle as in Theorem 3.6; hence we do not repeat it.
3.4 Practical Considerations
When implementing the TBIBΣ and fs-TBIBΣ schemes from Scheme 3
and Scheme 4, respectively, based on the BBG HIBE from Scheme 1,
some optimizations for efficient signing and verification can be
applied. We discuss them below.
Deterministic Verification. Contrary to verification algorithms of
standard signature schemes (e.g., EdDSA and ECDSA), the verifi-
cation algorithm of Naor-transformed signature schemes is prob-
abilistic. Consequently, the verifier needs access to a good source
of randomness which makes implementations even more complex.
Taking a step back, the goal of the test encryption and decryption
is to decide whether the derived key in the signature is a correctly
derived key for the identity. Depending on the underlying HIBE
it might, however, be possible to check the correctness of the key
with a deterministic method [14, 66].
Theoretically, one could attach a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof that certifies the correctness of the key derivation. Instead of
the test decryption, the verification of signatures would then verify
the zero-knowledge proof. More practically, aHIBE like BBG allows
one to check the derivation of the keys using pairing equations.
Assuming a derived key for the last level, skid1, ..., idℓ = (sk1, sk2)
we have that
e
(
h
H (id1)
1 · · ·h
H (idℓ )
ℓ
· д3, sk2
)
· e(д2, pk) = e(sk1, дˆ).
Conversely, if we have a key that satisfies the equation, then it is
also able to decrypt any ciphertext. Thereby, we obtain a faster and
deterministic verification algorithm.
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Faster Signing with Precomputation. Given that the IDs id1 to
idℓ−1 are fixed for the signer, signing can be implemented more
efficiently without computing hH (idi )i all the time. Given the secret
key ski, id = (a0,a1,bℓ), the signature can be computed as(
a0 · bH (m)ℓ ·
(
t · hH (m)k
)w
,a1 · дˆw
)
where t ← hH (id1)1 · · ·h
H (id2)
ℓ−1 · д3. This t can be either computed
when deserializing the secret key or directly be stored in the seri-
alized key. It can be reused for all subsequent signing operations,
thus saving O(ℓ) group operations and rendering signing runtime
complexity independent of ℓ. Similarly, when verifying signatures
this value can also be precomputed when deserializing the public
key. In this case, there is only a benefit if multiple signatures from
the same signer are verified at the same time.
4 INTEGRATION INTO TLS
We integrated our TBIBΣ scheme into TLS 1.3, the newest standard
of the TLS family. Since our implementation does not require any
changes to the TLS handshake or other parts of the protocol, TBIBΣ
could fit to older versions of TLS as well.
Status quo: Sharing the Secret Key. The typical CDN setup in-
volves a client, a CDN, and an origin server, as shown in Figure 2.
A client, usually a web browser, initiates the connection and wants
to retrieve some data from a remote server. To offload work and
improve connection speed, the origin server delegates some or all
of its work to a CDN. That happens either by uploading data to
the CDN servers beforehand or by functioning as a cache between
client and origin server. In the latter case, the CDN retrieves data
from the origin server when a client requests it, and then stores it,
making it faster available for further clients. The CDN is then able
to serve data on behalf of the origin server, therefore it is acting in
its name. To put that into practice, the origin server needs to point
its DNS domain name to the CDN. All connections between client
and CDN and between CDN and origin server are secured by TLS
and therefore authenticated.
To be able to serve content securely using TLS, a CDN needs to
be able to sign TLS sessions in the name of the origin server, as
generate CSR pk: pkserverCN: ccsw.io
Sign CSR
CSR
cer tserver
cer tserver
skserver
generate skserver
pkserver
ServerCA
CDN
Figure 2: Typical setup of a PKI involving a CDN. The origin
server shares its secret key skserver with the CDN.
ServerHello
Encrypted Extensions
Server Certificate (cer tserver )
cv = Sign(skserver , handshake)
Certificate Verify (cv )
Handshake Finished
Verify(pkserver , handshake, cv)
Verify PKI & cert validity
Client Finished
ClientHello
Client CDN
Figure 3: TLS flow of the communication of a client with a
CDN. The CDN uses the origin server secret key skserver to
sign the TLS handshake.
shown in Figure 3. Usually, that means a CDN needs access to the
secret key skserver of a certificate, which is valid for the origin
server domain. One way to achieve that is to share the secret key
with the CDN, as shown in Figure 2. Another approach is to allow
the CDN to acquire a valid certificate on its own.
Outsourcing a secret key is often neither easily possible nor de-
sirable. For example, in some industries, there might be regulations
in place which disallow that. Also, the idea of a secret key is for it
to remain secret. Sharing a secret key, or even allowing a CDN to
acquire its own, implicates loss of control, e.g., in case of a CDN
compromise or malicious CDN.
generate CSR pk: pkserverCN: ccsw.io
Sign CSR
CSR
cer tserver
skdeleд = Del(skserver , epoch, ccsw.io)
skdeleд
cer tserver
Mutual Authentication
skserver , pkserver = Gen(1K , n)
ServerCA
CDN
Figure 4: TLS setup involving TBIBΣ. The origin server cre-
ates a delegated key skdeleд and shares it with the CDN. The
secret key skserver never leaves the origin server.
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Server Hello
Encrypted Extentions
Server Certificate (cer tserver )
σ = Sign(skdeleд, handshake)
Certificate Verify (σ )
Handshake Finished
epoch = дetCurrentEpoch()
Verify(pkserver , epoch, ccsw.io, handshake, σ )
Verify PKI & cert validity
Client Finished
ClientHello
Client CDN
Figure 5: TLS handshake utilizing TBIBΣ. The CDN uses the
delegated key skdeleд to sign the handshake, while the client
uses the server’s public key pkserver and the Verify function
defined in Scheme 3 to verify the signature.
4.1 Our Approach: Delegating the Secret Key
To solve these issues, we use the TBIBΣ scheme introduced in Sec-
tion 3 to enable an origin server to delegate the capability to sign
on its behalf without sharing the secret key. The setup is shown
in Figure 4. It is done by deriving a delegated key skdeleд from
the secret key skserver by the origin server. The server sends the
delegated key to the CDN, which uses it for signing the TLS hand-
shakes. Clients use the public key from the origin server certificate
to verify this signature, as shown in Figure 5. No changes to the
TLS handshake are required.
A delegation derivation also involves the domain name of the
origin server and a validity epoch. Including the domain name can
be used to limit the validity of the delegation to a subdomain. This
is further described in Section 3.1. The epoch restricts the validity
period of the delegation, thus enabling short-lived delegations. The
origin server periodically derives a new delegation and sends it to
the CDN over a mutually authenticated channel. A CDN server
always uses the delegation which is currently valid, thus signed
for the current epoch. To verify the signature, a client inputs the
subdomain it connected to and the current epoch, together with the
handshake’s hash. If the signature verification process finds that
those same input parameters produced the derived signature, it will
assure its correctness. The advantages of this approach are: (1) The
CDN only holds a derived key, and the secret key never leaves the
origin server. Therefore, the origin server remains in control of the
private keys. (2) The derived key only lasts for a limited amount of
time, so the epoch limitation works as an inexpensive revocation
alternative. (3) If fs-TBIBΣ is used, the origin server’s private key
additionally enjoys forward-security properties. (4) No changes to
the TLS handshake are needed. Support for an additional signature
algorithm is enough to integrate our approach.
As additional protection of the secret key, the origin server owner
may use a dedicated keyserver, thus moving the key material to
a different server than the data it serves. The delegated key gets
pushed to the CDN, allowing tighter network protection of the
(key) server, since no incoming connections are necessary. Since
that is happening before the delegation becomes valid, there is no
delay due to delegation or transport. Besides, it is always possible to
store the key material on secure hardware like a hardware security
module (HSM). Precomputation of delegated keys is also possible,
allowing even more flexible key storage.
Definition 4.1 (Epoch). An epoch, we define as an integer, low-
resolution timestamp, forming the identifier of a time period of
length epochlength. It is easily possible to derive the identifier from
any timestamp or the clock, given by timestamp. This timestamp
represents the number of seconds since someT0, e.g., the Unix epoch
or the certificate’s NotBefore field.
An example of an algorithm is used in the TOTP protocol [48]
and can be formulated as epoch =
⌊
timestampUTC/epochlength
⌋
.
During signature verification, the client itself is deriving the
current epoch from the clock. Thus, since the CDN does not trans-
mit the epoch, a malicious CDN cannot use an old delegation by
convincing the client to use an old timestamp. That ensures only
delegations for the current time are valid.
Considerations on the Length of an Epoch. Since the length of an
epoch is neither part of the derivation itself nor a parameter part
of the TLS handshake, it needs to be agreed on beforehand (e.g.,
defined in an corresponding standard document). Similar to the
validity period of an OCSP response, the length of an epoch can
range from a few minutes up to a week [24, Figure 8].
On the one hand, the epoch length should not be too long. While
it is not possible to revoke a delegation after it has been issued and
pushed out, it is possible to revoke the certificate itself. By doing
so, the delegation loses its trust, since the certificate serving as
the basis of the delegation is no longer valid. Since revocation of a
certificate often comes with some operational cost [24, 57, 68], it
makes sense to set the length of an epoch to a short value.
On the other hand, end-user clients often do not have a precise
clock time available [2]. To counteract that, we propose to also con-
sider the epoch before and after the current one during validation
of the delegation. Depending on the implementation, that requires
up to two additional signature verifications.
Implication on Revocation. While a delegated private key extends
the authority to use a certificate to a third party (CDN), it does not
remove other PKI mechanisms currently in use. A client is expected
to verify the validity of the used certificate in addition to verifying
the delegation. As a consequence, revocation mechanisms like CRL
and OCSP can still be used. Furthermore, an epoch cannot expand
the validity period of the certificate itself, although it provides an
additional way to limit the validity period further.
4.2 Changes to Existing TLS Implementations
In this section, we describe changes that we had to make for imple-
menting the scheme into an existing TLS library.
Certificate and Certificate Authority. X.509 certificates are flexi-
ble enough to to support public keys of new signatures schemes
as long as an algorithm specifier (OID) is assigned and an ASN.1
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encoding is defined for the keys. Therefore, the library implement-
ing TBIBΣ support has to provide the handling of this data. Other
specifying an OID and the encoding, no changes are required to
the X.509 specification. For certificate authorities, the process of
signing TBIBΣ public keys is not different from signing other pub-
lic keys. For checking the Certificate Signing Requests (CSR), CAs
require a TBIBΣ implementation to verify the self-signature.
Origin Server. The server uses its secret key skserver and a
TBIBΣ tool to periodically derive a delegated key skdeleд . It then
pushes the delegation to the CDN before the delegation becomes
valid. To do so, it may use a standard HTTP client and a mutually
authenticated TLS connection. Consequently, the latter does not
involve changes to existing layers or software.
Content Delivery Network. During setup and once before every
epoch, the CDN receives a delegation key skdeleд from the origin
server. Also, it retrieves the corresponding certificate, which is valid
for the domain it serves. During each new client connection, the
CDN uses the received delegated key to sign the hash of the TLS
handshake. Sending the resulting signature as Certificate Verify
message to the client ensures the authentication of the connection.
To enable that, we integrated the TBIBΣ library in TLS stack. All
protocol operations are part of the standard TLS handshake, and
no additional ones are required outside.
Client. We also extended the crypto library used by the TLS stack
on the client with our TBIBΣ scheme. Furthermore, we extended the
TLS stack to support handling of TBIBΣ public keys. That allows
the client to use standard X.509 certificates containing a public key
of our scheme to verify the signature issued by the CDN. Besides, it
enabled the client to advertise support for TBIBΣ keys in the initial
ClientHello message. The required changes are limited to those
commonly required to add a new signature algorithm.
In addition, the client carries out standard PKI checks to au-
thenticate the server certificate, namely certificate chain check,
revocation check, hostname validation, validity in time, and check
corresponding to possible TLS extensions. No adaptions to those
checks were required.
Remark 2 (Implementation in TLS Libraries and Major Browsers).
Pairing libraries are widely available nowadays. For libraries writ-
ten in C or any language with C bindings available, relic [3] is a
good choice to implement the TBIBΣ scheme. In particular, since
relic implements optimization for the computation of pairing prod-
ucts. Hence, integrating the scheme in OpenSSL or any of its forks
as well as GnuTLS is easily possible. Similarly, integration in major
browsers such as Chrome and Firefox is thus also possible. We
also want to note that pairing libraries are also available for mod-
ern programming languages such as Rust.3 Hence, even with the
ongoing transition of Firefox to Rust, integration of TBIBΣ is pos-
sible. We also want to note the ongoing standardization effort of
pairing-friendly curves to ensure compatibility between implemen-
tations [53].
3For example, https://github.com/zkcrypto/pairing, retrieved May 04, 2020.
4.3 Other Applications
TLS without CDNs. In Section 4.1, we described the application
of TBIBΣ in the context of a CDN. However, the scheme can also be
used without a CDN. For example, it is possible to use a delegated
private key directly on the origin server or respective load balancers.
In that scenario, the same entity is in control of all servers. The
approach still enables extended protection for the private key by
shielding it from the public network and reducing the risk of key
compromise at the endpoints.
A key server can create a new delegation once per epoch and
push it to the origin servers, and therefore does not need to be
reachable from outside or even on all the time. By doing so, not only
the private key gets better protection, but the operator also gains
the benefits of a short-lived certificate. That means the damage
in case of a compromise of the (derived) private key is limited
to the length of the (short) epoch instead of the (longer) validity
period of the certificate itself, even in cases where other revocation
mechanisms are not available.
Restriction of connection types. In our approach we describe how
time information can be used in an HIBS scheme to limit the valid-
ity period of a signature (and thus derived secret key) for TBIBΣ. In
addition to that, it is possible to use other information as identity
in a TBIBΣ scheme. For example, one could put a constraint on the
type of connection the TLS session is encapsulating. That enables
limiting the use of the delegation to, e.g., HTTP or SMTP connec-
tions. Similar to the Extended Key Usage extension [26], it is also
possible to put further constrains on the usage of the derived key.
To achieve that, one needs to extend the modifications we de-
scribe in Section 4.1 and add an additional level that uses a normal-
ized connection type specifier as identity. For example, a delegation
intended to be used by a webserver would be derived using ‘http‘
as identity. A web browser would then use the same string ‘http‘
to verify the key delegation. Adding additional levels also allows
CDNs to delegate keys on their own, i.e., CDN would receive a del-
egated key for a specific domain which can then be further derived
for specific content types, specific servers, data centres, and so on.
Other applications. Additionally, we note that the validity dates
in delegation schemes such as DeC or from [65] can be interpreted
as more fine-grained epochs. Hence, if the end date of the validity
period is set to the end of an epoch, DeC and other forms of dele-
gation schemes can be interpreted as TBIBΣ without fsEUF-CMA
security. Conversely, TBIBΣmay find applications beyond the scope
of TLS, e.g., for delegation in trust management.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate an instantiation of the TBIBΣ scheme
introduced in Section 3 based on HIBS from BBG and our applica-
tion into TLS described in Section 4. As expected, the cost of pairing
evaluations dominates the performance. Nevertheless, reasonable
fast pairing implementations are available and the performance
penalty for additional features is below reasonable round trip times.
5.1 Performance Measurements
To understand the performance implications of TBIBΣ, we imple-
mented it in C based on relic [3] for runtime figures. Furthermore,
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Table 1: Runtime benchmarks in ms of ECDSA, EdDSA, and
TBIBΣ from Scheme 3. The numbers for Ed25519 and ECDSA
are from OpenSSL 1.1.1 with enabled optimizations.
Algorithm Sign Verify
EdDSA (Ed25519) 0.05 0.14
ECDSA (sepc256r1) 0.02 0.08
TBIBΣ (BLS-381) 0.58 1.94
we implemented the TBIBΣ scheme as Java library based on EC-
Celerate [36] and integrated it in the iSaSiLk [37] stack to verify
our claims concerning easy integration into TLS.4 For the C imple-
mentation, we target 128 bit security. Hence we choose a pairing-
friendly Barreto-Lynn-Scott [6] curve with 381 bits (BLS-381) for
the C implementation. Following the recent security level estima-
tions [4, 47], this curve provides roughly 128 bit security. For the
Java implementation, we chose a variant of Barreto-Naehrig [7]
curve as BLS curves are not implemented in ECCelerate. As BN
curves we choose both curves with 256 and 461 bits. The latter
provides 128 bits security, whereas the former provides around 100
bits of security, which we deem enough for key material that is
recycled every three months as in the case of Let’s Encrypt [1].
TBIBΣ Evaluation. Runtime-wise, TBIBΣ signing requires two
exponentiations in G1 and one in G2, whereas verification requires
3 pairings. In comparison, the standard signature schemes EdDSA
and ECDSA require only a small number of operations in Zp and
one exponentiation in G for signing and 2 exponentiations in G
for verification. We present the performance figures for TBIBΣ in
comparison to OpenSSL’s EdDSA and ECDSA implementation in
Table 1. For OpenSSL, the numbers have been obtained by running
openssl speed, whereas the numbers for TBIBΣ were obtained
by averaging over 10000 runs. We performed all experiments on
a Thinkpad T450s with an Intel Core i7-5600U CPU. While the
numbers suggest that TBIBΣ is significantly slower, we note that
the ECDSA implementation in OpenSSL is heavily optimized for
the specific architecture. If assembler optimizations are disabled,
verification of ECDSA is close to TBIBΣ signing, as expected from
the number of group operations.
Regarding sizes of signatures and public keys, both EdDSA and
ECDSA have signatures with two scalars in Zp and the public key
contains a group element. For TBIBΣ, public keys contain an ele-
ment in G2 and signatures contain one element from G1 and G2
each. We can, therefore, approximate its size as 64 bytes, 96 bytes,
and 116 bytes if instantiated with BN-256, BLS-381, and BN-461,
respectively, if point compression is enabled and as 128 bytes, 191
bytes, and 230 bytes, respectively, if not enabled. An EdDSA or
ECDSA public key only uses 32 bytes with point compression en-
abled and 64 bytes without. Furthermore, the signature in latter
only sums up 64 bytes (two scalars in Zp ), while the TBIBΣ’s signa-
ture needs one element of both groups G1 and G2, which results in
96, 143, and 173 bytes, respectively, with point compression and 192
bytes, 286 bytes, 345 bytes, respectively without point compression.
TLS Evaluation. To measure the performance of TBIBΣ in the
use case of TLS, we implemented a Java Signature library based
4Implementations are available at https://github.com/IAIK/TBIBS/.
Table 2: Benchmarks of TLS 1.3 handshakes using RSA,
ECDSA, EdDSA, and TBIBΣ (one operation is a full hand-
shake) and sizes of the packets sent by the client (C) and the
server (S).
Algorithm ops/s s/ops bytes (C) bytes (S)
RSA (2048 bit) 8.942 0.112 643 1773
ECDSA (secp256r1) 9.254 0.108 643 1385
EdDSA (ed25519) 9.198 0.109 643 1330
TBIBΣ (BN-256) 7.703 0.130 645 2769
TBIBΣ (BN-461) 4.598 0.217 645 3915
on Java Cryptography Architecture guidelines. The IAIK ECCel-
erate Library served as a backend for cryptographic elliptic curve
operations. Furthermore, the iSaSiLk library, supporting the Java
Cryptography Architecture, was adapted to the TBIBΣ signature
library. Then, a demo client and server were implemented with this
TLS library. The measurements for the other algorithms were also
performed using the same Java libraries.
For benchmarking the TBIBΣ algorithm and TLS adaption, we
used OpenJDK’s Java Microbenchmark Harness (JMH) library. Fur-
thermore, we used Linux’s traffic control queueing disciplines for
simulating network latency on our TLS benchmarks. The latency
we introduced amount to 10ms, with a variance of 1ms normal dis-
tributed. That results in a round trip time of 20ms, a typical delay
for a home’s network with Wireless and glass fiber connecting to
Google (c.f. [64]). Since all benchmarks have been performed on a
Thinkpad T450s with an Intel Core i7-5600U the absolute numbers
may not be comparable with performance on a server CPU.
Table 2 presents benchmarks showing the cost of a TLS hand-
shake using ECDSA, EdDSA and TBIBΣ. We can see that crypto-
graphic performance plays a much smaller factor in the overall
performance, as the slowdown is smaller than a factor of 2. For the
instance with BN-256, the slowdown is only a factor of 1.2. Further
optimization such as precomputation, as discussed in Section 3.4,
and an assembler implementation may reduce the performance
gap even further. Bandwidth-wise, Table 2 shows that in principle
TBIBΣ needs twice the amount of bytes than the other schemes.
On the other hand, the size does not exceed any supported TLS size
limits.
Discussion. As depicted in Table 2, applying TBIBΣ to TLS slows
the handshake by a factor of 1.2 with the smaller BN curves, and a
factor of 2 with the larger curves. That applies as long as we assume
a reasonable, inter-continental latency. If the latency is higher than
10ms, the performance difference decreases further. Furthermore,
we note that higly optimized assembler code as it can be found in
OpenSSL for ECDSA, would further reduce the performance gap.
As the relic-based implementation shows, verification performance
can be far beneath typical network latencies. Also, smaller and
embedded devices may benefit from hardware acceleration [63].
Besides, authentication using certificates is only required once.
Every further handshake to the CDN may use session resumption,
thus omitting any TBIBΣ related operations. Since a client may
connect more than once to the CDN until all data is loaded, the
difference becomes imperceptible.
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Comparing performance to Keyless SSL, our approach has the
advantage that means for authentication are pushed in prior and
do not have to be pulled just in time for every handshake. Further,
while the latencies between client and CDN might be subtle, they
can be pretty high on CDN to key server side, as they might, e.g.,
be geographically far apart [64].
5.2 Qualitative Evaluation
The most prominent advantage of our approach is that delegated
keys are bound to a specific epoch. That means if a delegated key
gets compromised, it only affects the security of that epoch. In subse-
quent epochs, the unforgeability guarantees are restored, and thus
proper authentication can be performed without entirely revoking
and recycling the origin server’s key material.
Besides, the origin server’s private key can be equipped with
forward-security features; thereby, the approach also offers mitiga-
tion against a compromise of the master key. Meaning that if the
origin server immediately updates its private key to the next epoch
after the delegations for the current epoch, compromise of that key
does not impact the authenticity of connections established in the
current epoch.
Another exciting aspect is the lack of modifications needed to run
the TBIBΣ scheme in TLS. The reason for it is that our short-lived
delegation infrastructure exclusively touches the cryptographic
part of the TLS stack. Because of that, PKI’s mechanisms, such as
revocation, still work without any changes as our proposal does
not touch them. Consequently, there is no need for a new multi-
party security assumption to be proven since no changes to the
TLS protocol per se are introduced. Therefore, the (S)ACCE proof
from Jager et al. [39] on TLS persists.
For the widespread adoption of a new signature scheme like
TBIBΣ, we would need approval by the CA/Browser Forum. Such
would demonstrate a wide acceptance by CAs, browser develop-
ers, and other internet stakeholders. DeC, on the other hand, only
needs an additional TLS extension, which is advantageous when
deploying.
Besides, our approach can offer an advantage steep delegation
hierarchies. Assuming we want to delegate by several levels h: Most
certificate-based solutions would verify a chain of certificates result-
ing in h verifications. However, our approach would transparently
support the additional levels while only consuming an additional
group operation per delegation level h.
Systematic Analysis. Finally, we characterize our approach by
applying the analysis framework published recently by Chuat et
al. [22]. Essential differences are shown in Table 3.
Damage-free CA-certificate revocation [22, Sec. 8 A], i.e. revoked
CAs would not invalidate certificates issued by the revoked CA
before it was compromised, are not directly provided by our ap-
proach. However, since we do not touch the PKI, a combination
with measures such as PKISN [61] will generically fulfill this bene-
fits. An unchanged PKI implies no need for trust-on-first-use and
preserves a low burden on Certificate Authorities. A downside may
be the extra involvement of CAs required to support the issuing
of certificates supporting the TBIBΣ scheme. Further, server and
browser compatibility is not given but may be attained through
an update of the supported signing algorithms. On the other hand,
Table 3: Selection of the most essential differences concern-
ing criteria from the framework ofChuat et al. [22]. offers
the benefit; partially offers benefit; does not offer the
benefit.
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Σ
Autonomous revocation
Domain-based policies
No increased page-load delay
No extra CA involvement
Server compatible
Browser compatible
browser-vendor involvement and out-of-band communication are
not needed in our approach.
Our approach supports delegation without key sharing by deriv-
ing a delegated key from the private one. Therefore we eliminate
the need to share the secret key itself. TBIBΣ can support domain-
based policies by adding new identities to the delegation, e.g., for
a content policy. Therefore, we consider this partially fulfilled by
DeC and TBIBΣ, as by default, they only define a validity period,
respectively, an epoch.
Further, TBIBΣ also offers the benefit of autonomous leaf revo-
cation, i.e., the domain owner can revoke credentials or certificates
at the end of the certification path. Strictly speaking, we do not
support revocation on delegated keys directly. However, domain
owners are free to refrain from distributing delegated keys for sub-
sequent epochs at any time, which leads to a rapid invalidation
of the delegation. Further, the validation of a delegation does not
reveal any content or metadata to a third party, preserving the
user’s privacy.
Our relic based implementation (cf. Table 1) suggests only a
small overhead compared to typical network delay. Furthermore,
our approach renounces to additional certificates omitting pressure
on certificate transparency logging [43]. Besides, the approach is
not proprietary and does not requiry any specialized hardware.
5.3 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that signature schemes with short-lived
delegation provide an interesting alternative to current delega-
tion practices in the TLS ecosystem. In specific, we presented a
forward-secure alternative to the approach used by Delegated Cre-
dentials. We used TBIBΣ to derive short lived keys that can sign
directly on behalf of the master key. Preservation of standard PKI
infrastructure and forward-security are the main features of the
approach and come with only small performance overheads, which
we demonstrated to be practical.
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A SIGNATURE SCHEMES
For completeness, we recall the standard definition of a signature
scheme.
Definition A.1. A signature scheme Σ consists of the PPT algo-
rithms (Gen, Sign,Verify), which are defined as follows:
Gen(1κ ) : On input security parameter κ outputs a signing key sk
and a verification key pk with associated message spaceM.
Sign(sk,m) : On input, a secret key sk and a message m ∈ M,
outputs a signature σ .
Verify(pk,m,σ ) : On input a public key pk, a messagem ∈ M and
a signature σ , outputs a bit b.
We note that for a signature scheme many independently gener-
ated public keys may be with respect to the same parameters pp,
e.g., some elliptic curve group parameters. In such a case we use an
additional algorithm Setup, and pp ← Setup(1κ ) is then given to
Gen. We assume that a signature scheme satisfies the usual (perfect)
correctness notion, i.e. for all security parameters κ ∈ N, for all
(pk, sk) ← Gen(1κ ), for allm ∈ M, we have that
Pr[Verify(pk,m, Sign(sk,m)) = 1] = 1.
Below, we recall the standard existential unforgeability under adap-
tively chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA security) notion, which
requires that even with access to a signing oracle an adversary is
unable to forge signature on message that have not been queried.
The experiment has access to the following oracles:
Sign′(sk,m) : This oracle computes σ ← Sign(sk,m), addsm to
Q, and returns σ .
Experiment Expeuf-cmaΣ,A (κ)
(pk, sk) ← Gen(1κ )
(m∗,σ ∗) ← ASign′(sk, ·)(pk)
if Verify(pk,m∗,σ ∗) = 0, return 0
ifm∗ ∈ Q, return 0
return 1
Experiment 5: The EUF-CMA experiment for a signature
scheme Σ.
Definition A.2 (EUF-CMA). For any PPT adversary A, we define
the advantage in the EUF-CMA experiment Expeuf-cmaΣ,A (cf. Experi-
ment 5) as
Adveuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) := Pr
[
Expeuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) = 1
]
.
A signature scheme Σ is EUF-CMA-secure, if Adveuf-cmaΣ,A (κ) is a
negligible function in κ for all PPT adversaries A.
